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1. Introduction
Experimental economics focus on the functioning of labor markets has been growing 
over the years and the advantages of applying experimental methods to labor economics 
have been extensively discussed (see, e.g., Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder 2009, Charness 
and Kuhn 2011). Experiments allow for tight control over the several environmental 
factors that can affect individual behavior, and render causal relations easier to infer. 
The possibility of controlling these factors implies the possibility of varying them and 
studying whether and to what degree the enforced changes affect decisions. This feature 
seems to be particularly suitable  to analyze labor  markets,  where a large amount  of 
labor-related  available  data  are  circumstantial,  implying  that  it  becomes  difficult  to 
exactly discern which factors play which role in the realization of a given outcome.
The experimental labor economics literature is quite vast with a wide range of issues 
addressed and this survey does not intend or pretend to cover the experimental labor 
literature in all its breath. We rather focus on two aspects that we deem important for a 
better understanding of labor market relations and the consequences for labor market 
policies. More specifically, the first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess 
the prevalence of reciprocal considerations in incomplete labor contracts. The second 
part summarizes the relatively small but growing experimental literature exploring labor 
issues  in  a  macroeconomics  and public  finance  setting  and studying the  interaction 
between  taxation  and  labor  market  outcomes.  Readers  interested  in  other  aspects 
explored in experimental labor economics and, especially, principal-agent relationships, 
such  as  work  incentives  or  multi-task  problems,  arbitration,  job  search  or  gender 
differentials, which are referred to the excellent review of Charness and Kuhn (2011) 
and Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009).
In this survey, first, our attention goes to incomplete labor markets. Labor relations 
are  often  contractually  incomplete  in  the  sense  that  effort  is  typically  not  (fully) 
contractible  or enforceable  by a third party.  This feature leaves  room for reciprocal 
motivations to play a role in the work process as workers’ general job attitudes become 
important  (Fehr  and  Falk  1999).  The  gift-exchange  game,  first  implemented  and 
introduced into the literature by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), was designed to 
mimic  precisely  this  situation.  It  tests  the  so-called  gift  exchange  hypothesis  of 
efficiency wage theory (Akerlof 1982; Akerlof and Yellen 1988, 1990), according to 
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which, and in contrast to standard theory, there is a positive relationship between the 
wages offered by firms and the effort exerted by workers. In a gift-exchange market 
wage offers are binding, while workers can discretionarily choose the amount of effort 
to exert. Experimental evidence has shown that a positive relation between wages and 
effort indeed emerges in such markets. While we provide a survey of the main results 
related  to  the existence  of  this  positive  wage-effort  relation  we also focus  on those 
studies that have tried to assess the implication of these findings for policy making. In 
addition, the robustness of the positive wage-effort relation is surveyed showing that 
while it  survives many institutional variations and experimental conditions, there are 
also environmental factors under which gift-exchange has difficulties to emerge.
The possibility of using laboratory experiments to better understand the functioning 
of markets  has been mostly explored to study causal  relationships  at  a  micro level. 
However, lab experiments can also be a valuable research tool for gaining insights into 
the effects of alternative labor policies or institutions at a macro level. Indeed, the main 
strengths of the experimental method, control and replication, can be very useful in the 
domain of macroeconomics which traditionally relies on circumstantial field data which 
may suffer from data non-availability, endogeneity or measurement error. This implies 
that  the  casual  impact  of  a  given  variable,  e.g.  an  increase  of  a  labor  tax,  on  the 
economic performance becomes difficult to be assessed. Experimental labor economics 
in  macroeconomics  context  can  be  useful  here  and  help  overcome  some  of  these 
problems. The second part of this survey focuses on the small but growing literature of 
laboratory labor market experiments in a macroeconomics and public finance context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the interaction 
between  contractual  incompleteness  and  gift-exchange  and  is  subdivided  into  an 
introductory section describing the common features of most of the studies. Thereafter, 
some fundamental results are reviewed followed by a section discussing the interaction 
between gift-exchange and explored labor market institutions and policies. At the end 
studies  investigating  the  robustness  of  the  gift-exchange  relationship  are  reviewed. 
Section 3 surveys labor market experiments in a macroeconomics and public finance 
context. Finally, Section 4 concludes and outlines suggestions for future research.
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2. Experimental gift exchange labor markets
2.1 Common features across experiments
Many of the experiments described in this section ground on a similar basic frame of the 
gift-exchange  game.  At  the  beginning  of  the  experimental  session,  subjects  are 
randomly assigned the roles of either firms or workers, and they keep their role during 
the whole session. In the first stage, firms offer a contract specifying the wage. In some 
version workers have to accept  what  is  offered while  in others the contract  may be 
rejected in favor of some outside option. In the second stage, workers decide on the 
level of effort they want to exert, which is costly to them but profitable to the firm. 
Mostly (but not always) this two-stage game repeated for several periods with the same 
or  changing  firm-worker  pairs.  For  the  first  stage,  the  wage  formation  process, 
commonly one of three institutions is explored: bilateral bargaining, one-sided auction 
or double auction markets.
In bilateral bargaining, a firm is exogenously and randomly matched with a worker 
either only at the beginning of the experiment or at the beginning of each period. In 
each period, a firm proposes a wage only to the worker with whom it has been matched. 
In one-sided auction markets, firms publicly announce their wage offers, which can 
be accepted  by any worker.  Firms are allowed to  revise their  (non-accepted)  offers 
according to  an  improvement  rule,  so that  the  new offers  must  be  higher  than  any 
existing wage offer. Workers cannot make counteroffers.  In double auction markets, 
both,  firms and workers, can submit and accept  wage offers at  any time during the 
trading  period.  In  both  market  institutions,  after  a  wage  contract  is  concluded  the 
involved firm and the worker  are  removed from the market  for that  trading period. 
Hence,  in  contrast  to  bilateral  bargaining,  the  matching  process  is  endogenous  and 
occurs through the acceptance of a wage proposal. Firms and workers who do not strike 
a contract receive some reservation earnings.  In the most common implementation, at 
most one contract per period can be concluded and often there is an excess supply of 
labor.
In the basic implementation of the second stage, the worker’s costly effort choice, 
firms can neither punish nor reward workers for their choice. Further all institutional 
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features are public knowledge, including the number of firms, workers, and periods, the 
matching mechanism, the feasible effort levels, the costs of effort, the wage range, and 
the payoff functions. Wage offers may be public or private depending on the chosen 
market institution,  but a worker’s effort  choice is always private information,  in the 
sense that it is only revealed to the firm with which the worker has concluded a contract. 
Identities of trading partners are usually not revealed.
Effort levels and cost function
Most studies reviewed here adopt one of two effort-cost schedules. In one version 
costs  c(e)  are increasing and convex in effort  e  as,  e.g.,  in Table 1,  and in another 
common version costs are linear in effort.
Table 1: Effort levels and costs of effort
Effort e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Cost c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Payoff functions
Also regarding the payoff functions for firms and workers there are two commonly 
implemented versions. Firms’ payoff function is often a version of
πF = (v – w)e + k (1)
or
πF = v – w + k (2)
where  v denotes an exogenously given redemption value,  w the wage,  e the effort 
chosen by the worker, and k some lump-sum transfer..
Workers’ payoff function is basically always implemented as the difference between 
the accepted wage, w, the incurred effort cost, c(e), and some fixed costs or transfer c0:
πW = w – c(e) – c0. (3)
The parameter  values are chosen such that under the assumption of material  self-
interest  workers  will  never  choose  an  effort  level  higher  than  the  minimum effort, 
irrespective of the accepted wage. Rational and materially selfish firms will anticipate 
this  and,  hence,  offer  the  lowest  positive  wage  satisfying  workers’  participation 
constraint. The predicted outcome is thus low wages, low efforts, and most importantly 
no  positive  relationship  between  wages  and  effort  levels.  Alternatively,  the  gift-
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exchange hypothesis (Akerlof 1982), postulates a positive correlation between wages 
offered  and  effort  provided  and,  in  consequence,  higher  than  minimum  wages  and 
higher than minimum effort levels.1 
2.2 Fundamental results
This section reviews some of the seminal experimental gift-exchange labor markets and 
summarizes now well-established empirical results on the wage-effort relation emerging 
in markets characterized by contractual incompleteness regarding workers’ effort. First, 
early experiments are presented, where the gift-exchange hypothesis is tested in one-
shot  encounters.  In these experiments  firms and workers meet  essentially  only once 
leaving  no  or  little  room  for  reputation  concerns.  Next,  we  survey  papers  where 
reputation may play a role due to repeated interactions between the same firm-worker 
pair.  Finally,  we  present  evidence  on  the  role  of  negative  reciprocity  and  wage 
attribution on the functioning of gift-exchange labor markets.
Gift-exchange in one-shot interactions
Evidence on the presence of gift-exchange in experimental labor markets dates back 
to the experiment implemented by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) who have been 
the first to use the above described set-up to test for the validity of the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis. They model the labor market as a one-sided auction and frame it in good 
market terms, with a language that involves buyers and sellers who choose prices and 
quality. The authors observe clear evidence in favor of the gift-exchange hypothesis as 
wages and effort are clearly above their respective minimum level and also do not show 
any  tendency  to  decline  over  periods.  Additionally,  wage  and  effort  are  strongly 
positively correlated, with higher wages being reciprocated by higher effort levels.
In a second paper, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) check whether observed high 
wages are due to firms’ unconditional preference to pay high wages or whether it is 
because of workers’ willingness to reciprocate high wages with high effort levels. They 
compare two different treatments (reciprocity treatment and control treatment) which 
1 The gift-exchange wage-effort relationship can be rationalized by assuming outcome based social 
preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), intention-based reciprocal 
motives (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004), and a mixture of both (Levine 1998, Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006).
5
differ only in that in the control treatment effort levels are exogenously fixed at the 
lowest  effort  level,  eliminating  opportunities  for  gift-exchange,  whereas  in  the 
reciprocity treatment, workers are free in their effort choices. Since subjects participated 
in both treatments it could be tested if the same firms change behavior or not. What is 
found  is  that  very  same  firms  which  pay  rather  high  wages  when  workers  can 
reciprocate lower their offers when the effort is fixed by the experimenter. This shows 
that it is (to a large extent) not firms unconditional preference to pay high wages but that 
they are induced by experienced and anticipated low effort responses to low wages, 
which in turn would lower firms’ profits.
Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998) are the first to study the effect of the 
competition among workers on wages. To this  purpose, they conduct three different 
treatments:  a  one-sided  auction,  which  they  call  gift-exchange  market  (henceforth 
GEM), a bilateral  gift-exchange (BGE) and a complete contract market (CCM). The 
CCM and the GEM are identical to each other, except for the fact that in the CCM the 
maximum effort level is exogenously enforced. By comparing the wages in these two 
markets it could be assessed whether the high wages in the GEM as found by Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993,1998) are indeed attributable to gift-exchange. In BGE 
firms and workers are exogenously matched, so that competition in the labor market 
cannot play any role. Hence, comparing the wages in the BGE with those in the GEM 
helps understand to what extent competition affects wage levels. 
The authors find that high wages are reciprocated by high efforts both in GEM and 
BGE, with no tendency for this positive correlation to decline over time. Importantly, 
already after  a few periods wages in GEM and BGE coincide,  indicating that  labor 
market  competition  has  no effect  on wage formation.  However,  wages  in  GEM are 
significantly above wages in CCM, where firms constantly try to enforce lower wages. 
This suggests that firms anticipate workers’ reciprocal responses and that the payment 
of noncompetitive wages generates higher profits. In consequence, firms are unwilling 
to enforce low wages when there is room for workers to reciprocate with effort.
Gift-exchange and reputation
Employment relationships are seldom characterized by one-shot transactions, rather 
employers and employees often interact repeatedly over time, which creates incentives 
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for even for materially selfish workers to be act reciprocally, if they can expect (future) 
material gains from it. This potential reputation effect has been explored in Gächter and 
Falk (2002). In their experiment they compare behavior in a one-shot (OS) treatment 
two that in a repeated game (RG) treatment, where the same firm-worker pairs interact 
repeatedly.
In line with other findings, they find that taken across all periods, both average wages 
and effort levels exceed the minimal values. Importantly, what they also find is that for 
similar wages in the two treatments, workers’ are more reciprocal in their effort choices 
in  RG  than  in  OS:  This  shows  that  repeated  interaction  and  reputation  incentives 
strengthen  the  positive  wage-effort  relation.  An  individual  level  analysis  further 
suggests  that  selfish  subjects  have  a  strong incentive  to  imitate  reciprocity  because 
providing high effort in response to high wage offers helps their reputation and gives 
them access to attractive wage offers. Hence, the repetition disciplines (at least some of) 
the selfish individuals.
Brown,  Falk  and  Fehr  (2004)  implement  three  treatment  conditions  in  order  to 
investigate how contractual incompleteness affects the nature of market interactions and 
the  formation  of  relational  contracts.  In  all  treatments,  the  market  for  contracts  is 
organized as a one-sided auction where contracts consist of a wage, a desired effort 
level,  and  the  firm’s  ID number.  In  the  complete  contracts  treatment  (C),  a  firm’s 
desired effort level is exogenously enforced by the experimenter. Under the incomplete 
contract condition (ICF), the worker can choose any effort in the feasible range. In both 
these  treatments,  firms  and  workers  have  fixed  ID  numbers  throughout  the  whole 
experimental session, which allows for repeated interactions with the same trader. That 
is, a firm can address its contract offer to a specific worker in consecutive periods. In 
the third treatment (ICR), firms and workers are randomly assigned a new ID number in 
each period,  ruling out the possibility for them to enter long-term relations.  In each 
trading period firms can make private or public offers, where private offers are only 
transmitted to the worker with whom a firm wants to trade while public offers can be 
seen and accepted by any worker in the market.
The authors find that, under complete contracts, traders are indifferent to their trading 
partners’ identities, whereas firms strongly prefer to trade with the same worker over 
many consecutive periods, when third party enforcement  is  ruled out.  In the former 
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case, contract offers are mostly public offers and the majority of trades take place in 
one-shot transactions. In contrast, under the incomplete contract condition, trades are 
usually privately initiated and bilateral relationships emerge.
In the C treatment, firms pay relatively low wages and appropriate the largest share of 
the gains from trade; whereas in ICF they pay high wages and earnings from trade are 
distributed rather equally. Effort is significantly higher in ICF, while in the treatment 
where the possibility of contract renewals is removed, average effort drops and workers 
choose the minimal effort level in most cases. An important insight from this paper is 
that  firms  use  high  wages,  together  with  the  threat  of  firing,  to  discipline  selfish 
workers. They adopt a policy of contingent contract renewal where relatively high effort 
levels are rewarded with a new contract, while relations with workers providing low 
effort are terminated with high probability.
Gift exchange, negative reciprocity and wage attribution
Some of the results survived above have been criticized because they are obtained in 
an environment that may favor workers’ opportunity to exhibit positive reciprocity, that 
is by responding to high wages with high effort levels. However, negative reciprocity, 
the willingness to incur costs to punish unkind actions, may also have a role in the wage 
formation with potential opposite effects. As low effort responses to low wages may 
unravel into even lower wages and efforts.
To study the  role  of  negative  reciprocity,  Fehr  and  Falk  (1999)  compare  double 
auction  labor  markets  where  effort  is  endogenous  (main  treatment)  to  others  where 
effort is exogenously fixed (control treatment), with excess supply of workers in both 
cases.  What  distinguishes  this  experiment  is  the  implementation  of  a  modified  cost 
function, according to which a selfish money-maximizing worker should always choose 
the maximum effort level, because lower levels are more costly. Although, overall the 
positive wage-effort relation is still present, results from the main treatment show that 
workers indeed react to low wage offers by choosing non-maximal effort levels. This 
negatively reciprocal behavior leads firms to pay higher wages in the main treatment, 
even if workers underbid each other’s wage offers. In contrast, in the control treatment 
wages tend to decrease over time and to come close to the competitive equilibrium 
level. These findings show that firms may be reluctant to push wages down towards the 
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competitive  level,  if  workers  have  the  opportunity  to  punish  them  via  their  effort 
choices. Workers’ negative reciprocity has a remarkable impact on wage levels as it 
generates wages that are downwardly rigid.
Charness (2004) explores bilateral gift-exchange under three experimental conditions 
that differ in the wage-generating mechanism. First, wages are determined by the firm, 
second they are generated by a draw from a bingo cage, and, third, by an assignment by 
a third party, the experimenter. In all cases, workers are informed whether the received 
wage has  been assigned  by either  the  firm or  one  of  the  external  processes.  In  all  
treatments, there is a positive relationship between wages and effort levels. However, at 
low wages, the effort level is lower when the wage is chosen by a firm than when it is 
exogenously  generated,  suggesting  the  presence  of  negative  reciprocity.  That  is, 
workers never provide costly effort when a low wage can be attributed to the firm’s 
intention but do so when the low wage comes from an exogenous source. At high wage 
levels, there is essentially no difference in effort levels across treatments.
Pereira,  Silva  and  Silva,  J.A.  (2006)  compare  a  standard  gift-exchange  treatment 
(GET)  with  a  gift/offense-exchange  treatment  (GOET),  where  workers  have  the 
possibility  of reciprocating  either  positively  or  negatively.  In their  specification,  the 
GOET  is  characterized  by  some  asymmetry  with  higher  marginal  costs  when 
responding positively to a wage than when responding negatively. The reported results 
from the GET are in line with those in the literature. In the GOET, interestingly, a larger 
number of workers choose effort levels close to the materially selfish prediction even 
for wages that are clearly above the minimum wage. This may point to some framing 
effect  as  observed  in  dictator  allocation  experiments  (Bardsley  2008,  List  2007). 
Importantly,  also in GOET a significant  fraction of workers show either positive or 
negative reciprocal behavior.
The results from Charness (2004) suggest that the mechanism according to which 
wages are formed has a non-negligible impact on workers’ performances. Maximiano, 
Sloof and Sonnemans (2013) go an important step in this direction and study the wage 
attribution  issue  by  means  of  a  more  complex  gift-exchange  environment,  where 
ownership and control are separated. Specifically, owners do not directly set a worker’s 
wage and the manager, who actually determines the wage, does not bear the full wage 
costs and does also not fully benefit from workers’ higher efforts.
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The  authors  consider  four  treatments.  The  bilateral  condition  (BC)  is  a  standard 
bilateral gift-exchange setting, with a firm consisting of a single owner-manager who is 
directly  responsible  for choosing the worker’s wage. In the two trilateral  conditions 
(TC0 and TC25), the firm is owned by a shareholder, who claims most of the firm’s 
profit,  but  controlled  by  a  manager,  who  chooses  the  worker’s  wage.  In  TC0  the 
manager is paid a fixed wage and in TC25 condition the manager earns 25 percent of 
the  firm’s  profit.  In  the  fourth  treatment,  wages  are  randomly  determined  by  the 
experimenter (as in Charness (2004)). This last condition is used for checking whether 
control per se is important for the gift-exchange relationship or workers only care about 
the fact that wages are paid by the firm.
In all treatments, a gift-exchange wage-effort relationship is found. The higher the 
wage offered, the higher the average effort level chosen by workers, irrespective of the 
firm’s  composition  and  whether  the  manager  receives  part  of  the  profits  or  not. 
Importantly, the wage-effort relationship is steepest when wages are determined by a 
member of the firm. The finding that the wage-effort relationship does not differ among 
the three endogenous treatments indicates that workers are not particularly sensitive to 
how ownership and control are divided within the firm, but is reciprocal towards the 
firm as a whole.
2.3 Gift-exchange labor markets and policy instruments
Despite the robustness and prevalence of gift-exchange wage-effort relationships still 
relatively few experimental studies investigate policy implications of it. Among others, 
questions that could be asked are: Are (un)employment policies similarly (in)effective 
in  gift-exchange  and  complete  contract  markets?  Do  optimal  and  redistributive  tax 
policies have the predicted effects in gift-exchange labor markets? Here we survey a 
handful of experimental studies asking such important policy implications of the gift-
exchange in labor markets.
Taxation
Riedl and Tyran (2005) are the first to examine whether and to what extent statutory 
tax  incidence  affects  the  performance  of  efficiency-wage  markets  and  whether  Tax 
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Liability  Side Equivalence2 (tax  LSE) holds  in  gift-exchange labor  markets.  Theory 
predicts that tax LSE also holds in gift-exchange labor markets as long as participants 
are only concerned with net wages and profits. Yet, if workers make their effort choices 
on the basis of the gross wages and consider taxation as exogenous to the gift-exchange 
relation, tax LSE breaks down. This alternative hypothesis is suggested by a study of 
Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) who show that tax LSE may break down bilateral 
bargaining environments.
In  a  one-sided  auction  environment,  Riedl  and  Tyran  (2005)  implement  two 
treatments, differing in the sequence of two distinct tax regimes. In one regime the tax is 
levied on firms (Tax on Firms: ToF) while in the other regime workers are instead 
obliged to pay the tax (Tax on Workers: ToW). Each regime lasts for 16 trading periods. 
The authors find that  the gift-exchange relation,  that  is,  effort  level  increase with 
wage offers, is unaltered when taxes are introduced. The main result is, however, that 
tax LSE holds in the gift-exchange labor markets under study. None of the analyzed 
variables,  net  wages,  worker  efforts,  and  net  earnings,  significantly  differ  between 
regimes, not even in the short run. Average net wages are almost the same in both tax 
regimes right from the very beginning. Net wages decrease somewhat when the tax is 
shifted from the firms to the workers, and increase somewhat when firms are taxed but 
none of these differences are found to be statistically significant. Similarly, workers’ 
earnings as well as firms’ profits are not different across nor within treatments, thus 
clearly supporting tax LSE.
Competition and wage rigidity
One main idea behind gift-exchange is that, given that the mechanism is at work, 
firms have no incentive to lower wages because this would lead to low performance of 
workers and, hence, to low profits. An implication of this is that wages are downwardly 
rigid. 
Following the work of Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998) the impact of 
competition on wage rigidity and gift-exchange has later been assessed by Fehr and 
Falk (1999), who investigate and confirm the existence of wage rigidities in a double 
auction market,  which is considered as particularly competitive (see, e.g., Davis and 
2 Tax LSE states that  “the statutory incidence (i.e., who legally pays a tax) is irrelevant for economic  
incidence (i.e., who bears the tax burden)” (Riedl and Tyran (2005)).
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Holt  1993).  As  mentioned  above  the  find  that  when  contracts  are  complete  wages 
decreases towards workers reservation wage while they stay high when contracts are 
incomplete  and  gift-exchange  is  at  work.  Importantly,  in  the  incomplete  contract 
environment workers underbid each other but firms are unwilling to accept low wage 
offers.
Brandts  and  Charness  (2004)  analyze  whether  gift-exchange  is  affected  by  the 
relative number of firms and workers on the market. They implement a market with 
excess supply of labor (ESL) and a market with excess supply of firms (ESF), with 
wage formation  in  a  one-sided auction.  In  addition,  they  compare  sessions  with 10 
trading periods to a single-period session. They find that wage and effort are positively 
correlated and that this relation is not affected by competitive pressure. Specifically, 
wages do not significantly differ across treatments and are generally quite high. The 
results from the single-period sessions are similar to those in the 10-period sessions. 
Hence, overall the gift-exchange relation appears to be robust to increased competition 
on the labor market.
Minimum wage legislation
The economic and social consequences of minimum wage legislations have received 
a growing attention over the years. Experimental evidence shows that changes in the 
level of the minimum wage strongly affect what is perceived by individuals as a fair 
wage, causing important effects on reservations wages, actual wages, and employment 
levels.
Brandts and Charness (2004) are the first who studied the effect of a minimum wage 
on the behavior of firms and workers in a gift-exchange context, with excess supply of 
workers. They find that the imposition of a minimum wage has a counterproductive 
effect in terms of effort exerted by workers. Although the relationship between wage 
and effort remains significantly positive, the impact on effort provision is negative. That 
is  at  all  wages,  effort  levels  are  lower.  The  average  effort  chosen when  there  is  a 
minimum wage is about 50 percent higher than when there is no minimum wage. In 
addition, the introduction of a minimum wage reduces the likelihood that a high wage is 
paid.
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Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006) look at the effects of minimum wage in an economy 
with complete contracts, where workers provide either zero effort, if they reject a wage 
offer, or automatically provide maximum effort, if they accept a wage offer. They find 
that,  when minimum wages are  introduced,  workers’  endogenous reservation  wages 
increase to above the level of the minimum wage. This suggests that being paid exactly 
the minimum wage is viewed as unfair by workers. In addition, the introduction and 
removal of a minimum wage have asymmetric effects. If existing minimum wages are 
removed reservation wages only marginally  decrease and remain substantially  above 
those prevailing before the introduction of the minimum wage. 
Owens and Kagel (2010) find partly contrasting results. They observe that that the 
introduction of the minimum wage results in an increase in average wages but also that 
dropping the minimum wage leads to a decrease in both average wages and average 
effort. When a minimum wage is introduced the effects on effort levels differ depending 
on the wage rate. At lower wage rates and, in particular, in the neighborhood of the 
minimum wage, a reduction in effort is detected, while no systematic effects on effort 
levels are found for higher wages.
Overall the evidence of the effect of minimum wages on provided effort is mixed. 
Importantly, however, the surveyed studies show that on the one hand, the minimum 
wage increases average wages inducing reciprocal workers to exert more effort. On the 
other hand, the minimum wage may alter subjects’ fairness perceptions perhaps due to a 
reference point effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman 
2011). Consequently, wages considered fair when there is no minimum wage tend to be 
perceived as less fair once there is a minimum wage. The net effect of the minimum 
wage on effort turns out to be ambiguous and depends on the relative size of these two 
counteracting effects (Fehr, Goette and Zehnder 2009). 
Sick pay
Duersch, Oechssler and Vadovic (2012) experimentally study how sick pay provision 
and  reciprocity  interacts  in  the  firm-worker  relationship.  According  to  the  authors, 
“contractual provision of sick pay is a perk, a sign of the firm’s goodwill, which may be  
rewarded by the worker with higher performance”, but this relation might realize in two 
different ways. One is referred to as the “gift-exchange hypothesis”, and claims that 
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workers  uniformly  reciprocate  sick  pay;  the  second  is  the  “selection  hypothesis”, 
according to which sick pay could favor the matching between those firms who offer 
sick pay and those workers who appreciate and reciprocate it.
The authors  adapt  the  standard gift-exchange game,  and modify it  accordingly  to 
specifically test these hypotheses. In each of 10 periods, employers have to choose from 
a menu of five contracts each consisting of a wage, w, which is paid if the worker shows 
up for  work,  and a  sick  pay,  s,  which  is  paid  otherwise.  Workers’  lowest  effort  is 
equivalent  to  (pretending  to)  being  sick  and  not  showing  up  at  the  workplace. 
Importantly,  the  lowest  effort  may  also  happen  for  reasons  outside  the  workers 
accountability. Firms, however, can only verify if workers show up or not.
Two main treatments are compared. In treatment M (Monopsony) firms and workers 
are  exogenously  and  anonymously  matched  in  each  period  and  in  treatment  S 
(Selection), firms compete for workers, and are given the possibility of hiring more than 
one worker. 
Gift-exchange  results  are  replicated.  Moreover,  offering  sick  pay  also  increases 
effort. However, the experimental data also show that offering sick pay contracts is not 
always the most profitable option for firms. In the M treatment firms sometimes even 
suffer losses. Interestingly, on the contrary, when firms have to compete for workers, 
they earn the highest profit when choosing a contract that offers only a partial sick pay. 
Firms realize this and most frequently chose the contract consisting of a partial sick pay. 
Another  important  result  is  that  sick  pay induces  self-selection  of  workers.  In  both 
treatments,  sick pay contracts  attract  more reciprocal  workers.  In conclusion,  in the 
presence of gift-exchange the effectiveness of sick pay is driven by the competition in 
the labor market.
Deferred compensation
Huck,  Seltzer  and  Wallace  (2011)  experimentally  test  Lazear’s  (1979)  model  of 
deferred compensation and examine the relationship between a firm’s wage offer and 
worker’s  effort  provision  in  a  three-period  game.  Deferred  compensation  contract 
schemes, where workers are underpaid in the early part of their career and overpaid 
during the  later  part,  are  theoretically  shown to induce  higher  effort  because  future 
payments  within the  firm always exceed future payment  elsewhere.  However,  since 
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firms can renege on future payments, the optimality of deferred contracts depends on 
whether an effective commitment mechanism is at  work or not. Four treatments are 
implemented.
In the main treatment, firms can fully commit to future wage offers (FCT). In the 
FCT, results  appear  to  be  mixed on both  sides,  firms  and workers.  While  deferred 
compensation  is  observed  not  all  firms  offer  the  predicted  wage  pattern  and  some 
workers shirk although they are incentivized not to do. In order to better understand that 
pattern the authors conduct to control treatments. In one of them, firms cannot commit 
to  pay  higher  wages  later  but  can  only  make  non-binding  promises  about  future 
payments (NCT). In the other, firms’ wage offers are generated by a computer (CFT) in 
order to control for the effect of outcome inequality.  When there is no commitment 
device, as predicted,  worker’s effort and efficiency is low. The main reason for this 
result seems to be that workers do not believe and hence reciprocate to promises of high 
future wages and actual wages are indeed lower than promised ones. However, there is 
evidence for gift-exchange but mainly within a period. Therefore, the authors conclude 
that the best strategy to induce high effort is not to offer a low wage early and promise a 
high wage later but offer a high wage right at the beginning. In another treatment, firms’ 
past history on wage promises and actual wages is made available to workers, in order 
to check for reputation effects (RT). The authors find that actually paying high wages to 
old workers has indeed a reputation effect and reputation may work as a commitment 
device,  although in the experiment  reputation is less effective than full  exogenously 
enforced commitment.
Gift exchange, incentive schemes and contract enforcement
Laboratory gift-exchange experiments show that reciprocity is an effective device to 
enforce  worker  effort  when  contracts  are  incomplete.  In  the  field,  also  material 
incentives are used to mitigate the enforcement problem. Therefore, the question of how 
explicit  performance incentives  and gift-exchange interact  with each other  has  been 
subject of several studies.
Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) conduct three treatments involving competitive 
markets  with  more  workers  than  firms.  In  each  treatment,  firms  specify  a  wage,  a 
desired effort level, and a fine imposed if they detect that workers have shirked (that is, 
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if they provided less than the specified level of effort). In the no-reciprocity-treatment 
(NRT)  contract  terms  are  exogenously  enforced  by  the  experimenter;  in  the  weak-
reciprocity-treatment (WRT) workers who accept a contract choose an effort level, and 
a random device determines whether the firms is able to verify shirking (which is then 
fined at the specified level); the  strong-reciprocity-treatment (SRT) has an additional 
third stage in which firms  can also respond reciprocally,  by rewarding or punishing 
workers (at a cost) after they observe actual effort choices.
The  results  from  WRT  show  that  firms’  behavior  is  affected  by  reciprocity 
considerations, as the number of generous offers is significantly higher than in the NRT. 
Nevertheless,  although workers engage on average in gift-exchange, shirking is  also 
quite  prevalent.  In  SRT firms demand and succeed in  enforcing much higher  effort 
levels than in the WRT. They punish workers who shirk and reward both those who 
exactly  meet  the  desired  effort  and  those  who  over-provide  effort.  This  motivates 
workers to strongly respond to high wages with high efforts. In consequence, this leads 
to a higher aggregate monetary payoff, meaning that both workers and firms are best off 
in the SRT.
Fehr and Gächter (2002) examine the possibility that explicit incentives may create a 
hostile  atmosphere  of  threat  and  distrust,  undermining  voluntary  contribution  and 
reducing any reciprocity-based extra effort. They conduct a gift-exchange experiment 
under two treatments, a trust treatment (TT), which resembles a standard gift-exchange 
game under the one-sided auction trading rules, and an incentive treatment (IT) where 
firms can punish shirking workers.
Surprisingly, at partly in contrast to the findings in  Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 
(1997), in TT firms offer, on average, higher wages and demand higher effort levels 
than in the IT, which results in higher actual average effort. The authors observe that the 
lower effort levels in IT are not caused by lower wage offers but that low wages are a 
response to the reduction of the workers’ willingness to reciprocate. Further, in terms of 
efficiency, the data show that the aggregate surplus is lower in the incentive treatment, 
due to the reduced effort levels. The authors conjecture that the negative incentive effect 
is due to framing the material inventive as punishment, which workers may perceive as 
unkind.  To  test  this,  an  additional  bonus  treatment  (BT)  where  a  shirking  worker, 
instead of paying a fine, does not receive a bonus if caught shirking, is conducted. The 
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incentive structure is  exactly  the same in IT and BT. Nevertheless,  large behavioral 
differences are observed in IT and BT. With the material  incentive framed as bonus 
effort levels are significantly higher than when it is framed as punishment.
Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007) compare the performance of three types of contracts. 
In the incentive contract the principal offers a wage, a required effort level, and a fine 
paid  in  case  the  agent  is  caught  shirking.  If  the  principal  invests  in  a  verification 
technology, agents’ effort choices are observed with the exogenous probability p = 1/3. 
In the trust contract, the principal offers a fixed wage to the agent and asks for high 
effort in return. Lastly, the bonus contract is similar to the trust contract, except that the 
principal announces that s/he might pay a bonus if the agent exerts more effort than it is 
required,  but  he  is  not  forced  to.  The  authors  conduct  a  bilateral  gift-exchange 
experiment with two treatments. In the trust-incentive treatment (TI), principals could 
choose between trust  contract  and the incentive  contract  and in  the  bonus-incentive 
treatment  (BI),  all  three contracts  could be chosen.  In TI,  it  is  found that  incentive 
contracts are chosen by most principals and increasingly preferred over time as they 
perform  better  from  the  firm’s  perspective.  Workers’  effort  levels  and  principals’ 
payoffs are higher with incentive contracts than with trust contracts. In stark contrast, in 
the  BI  treatment  bonus  contracts  are  chosen  much  more  often  than  the  incentive 
contracts  and  the  trust  contract  is  never  chosen  as  now the  bonus  contract  clearly 
outperforms the incentive contract. What the authors observe, therefore, is that, on the 
one hand, in TI fairness concerns are not powerful enough to contradict the standard 
theory prediction that incentive contracts are preferred to trust contracts. On the other 
hand, when a non-binding promise to pay bonuses is introduced, the results  conflict 
with what standard theory postulates.
In a later paper, Fehr and Schmidt (2007) wonder whether combining a bonus and an 
incentive contract  helps improving efficiency.  Principals  can choose between a pure 
bonus contract and a combined contract (CC), which therefore offers both a fine paid in 
case of detected shirking and the a voluntary bonus. Still, the authors find that the vast 
majority of principals prefer the pure bonus contract, which also turns out to be more 
efficient. These results seem to support the idea that, in many cases, explicit negative 
incentives  may crowd out intrinsic  motivation,  as agents  might  perceive a fine as a 
hostile act and the choice of monitoring the agents as a signal of distrust.
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In  a  recent  paper,  Eriksson and  Villeval  (2012)  study  whether  and  how respect, 
defined  as  “the  expression  of  recognition  by  an  employer  to  an  employee  after  
observing his performance”, is used by employers and perceived by employees. They 
compare  two  treatments.  The  first  treatment  resembles  the  gift-exchange  game  in 
Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004), where firms can submit either public or private wage 
offers in a one-sided auction market and build long-term relationships. In the respect 
treatment a third stage is added, where firms can express their respect towards their 
workers by sending them a non-monetary reward (a raised thumb) which is costly to 
them but does not change the workers’ payoff. Both treatments are played under three 
market conditions: one where the number of employers is the same as the number of 
employees, one with excess supply and one with excess demand in the labor market.
A, perhaps surprising, result is that the majority of employers do not send symbolic 
rewards. More symbolic rewards are sent when there is competition on the labor market 
than when it is balanced and they are mainly used to initiate longer-term relationships. 
Once established its use largely vanishes. Interestingly, receiving rewards induce higher 
efforts only when the market is balanced. In consequence, the respect treatment leads to 
higher profits only in that market condition.
Fehr,  Kirchsteiger  and Riedl  (1996) study incentive  effects  on efforts  in different 
environment. Specifically, they test whether, as the shirking version of the efficiency 
wage hypothesis predicts  (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), higher wages and lower effort 
requirements reduce shirking. In one treatment (EWE) firms with different production 
technologies offer contracts consisting of a wage, a required effort level, and a penalty 
levied on the worker in case caught shirking. The results are then compare to a market 
clearing experiments (MCE), where the incentive to pay efficiency wages is removed by 
allowing the imposition of a higher penalty. In the EWE it is observed that firms make a 
rational  and selfish  use  of  penalties,  meaning  that  the  great  majority  of  the  chosen 
penalties meet the standard theoretical predictions. However, wage offers and demanded 
effort levels tend to lie below the predicted values, suggesting that firms’ choices might 
be affected by risk aversion. In the MCE the market converges to the predicted values. 
Most importantly,  the authors find support for the efficiency wage hypothesis  as an 
increase in the wage offered reduces the probability of shirking and firms try to pay job 
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rents to induce workers not to shirk. Finally, it is shown that the existence of efficiency 
wages leads to involuntary unemployment.
2.3 Robustness and extensions of gift-exchange labor markets
Gift-exchange  labor  market  experiments  have  been  conducted  under  many 
environmental conditions. In particular, the strong positive relationship between wage 
and effort has been confirmed by a large number of papers. There are, however, some 
experimental  conditions  where  gift-exchange  may  not  be  robust  against.  The 
experiments summarized in this section propose extensions of the basic gift-exchange 
game  design  and  the  try  to  assess  whether  and  to  what  extent  changes  in  the 
environmental features impact on behavior.
Gift-exchange, multi-worker firms and social comparisons
The external validity of experimental results gathered in relative simple environments 
is a challenge for experimental economics in general and for gift-exchange labor market 
experiments  in  particular.  For  instance,  the  mostly  used  implementation  of  gift-
exchange  markets  where  employment  relationships  involve  one  employer  and  one 
employee may limit the validity of results for cases where employers can hire more than 
one worker.
Maximiano,  Sloof  and Sonnemans (2007) compare  a standard one-employer–one-
worker (1–1) bilateral gift-exchange game with one in which each firm has four workers 
(1–4). In the latter case, the firm has to pay the same wage to all workers, who then 
simultaneously decide how much effort to provide without knowing the effort choices 
of their  co-workers. In both treatments,  workers choose, on average,  a higher effort 
level when the offered wage is higher and the difference between treatments is small 
and statistically not significant. Although, the wage-effort relationship is steeper in the 
in the 1–1 treatment, overall the wage-effort relation is robust to an increased number of 
workers within a firm. 
The  previous  paper  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  agents  at 
different  levels  in  the firm hierarchy.  Charness  and Kuhn (2007),  examine how the 
horizontal relationship between workers and the observation of each other’s wages may 
affect effort choices.  They match  two workers with different productivity levels (high 
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and low) within one firm. Workers know that their productivity is different from their 
co-workers’, but they do not know the direction of this difference. Firms can offer their 
workers different wages. The authors also vary, in a within-subjects design, whether 
wage offers are public (both workers know both wages) or private (workers know only 
their own wage). 
Data show that, when a co-worker’ wage is secret, workers’ effort choices respond 
very strongly to  their  own wage, while  no effect  of co-workers’ wages on effort  is 
found. The more interesting result is that the same holds when workers are informed of 
their co-workers’ wage before choosing their own effort. Hence, workers seem to be 
mainly concerned with their own wage offer and horizontal comparisons are either not 
important  or wage differences  are perceived as justified because of the productivity 
differences.
Charness and Kuhn’s (2007) results are challenged by a recent paper by Gächter and 
Thöni  (2010).  They  find  that,  when  a  worker  is  paid  less  than  a  co-worker,  s/he 
significantly reduces his/her effort relative to a situation where equal wages are paid. It 
has to be emphasized, however, that in contrast to Gächter and Thöni (2010) workers in 
Charness  and Kuhn (2007) are  characterized  by different  productivity  levels,  which 
likely  affects  effort  responses.  Gächter  and  Thöni  (2010)  broaden  this  analysis  by 
investigating whether the observed pay comparison effects actually come from wage 
differences or are instead due to an aversion to intentional wage discrimination. In an 
additional treatment, a random device chooses workers’ wages on behalf of firms. It 
turns out that disadvantageous wage discrimination does not result anymore in reduced 
effort levels and, hence, intentionality is the source of reduced efforts in case of unequal 
wages.
Gächter,  Nosenzo  and  Sefton  (2010)  go  a  step  further  and  investigate  whether 
exposure to both pay and effort comparison information influences reciprocal behavior. 
In  a  three-person gift-exchange  game,  the  employer  chooses  a  wage,  which  can  be 
different for different workers; the employees first observe both wages and then choose 
(sequentially) an effort level. The worker who moves second (Employee 2), hence, also 
receives information about the co-worker’s effort choice.
The authors find that in this  setting pay comparisons do not affect effort choices. 
However, for a given wage combination, a worker’s effort depend on the co-worker’s 
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effort  decision.  Employee  2  exerts  high  effort  if  Employee  1  does  so  and tends  to 
choose  low  effort  if  the  co-worker  also  chooses  low  effort.  Hence,  on  average 
reciprocity  towards  the  employer  is  weakened  by  exposure  to  effort  comparison 
information.
Nosenzo (forthcoming) studies pay comparison effects in a gift exchange game where 
one employer is matched with two symmetric employees, and compares effort choices 
under three treatments: in the “pay secrecy” treatment the employer chooses the two 
wages s/he pays to the employees and each employee only knows his/her own wage, in 
the two “public wages” treatments both wages are known to both employees. The two 
“public wages” treatments differ in how wages are determined. In one treatment the 
employer can choose both wages, while in the other one wage is chosen exogenously set 
by  the  computer.  The  data  show that  information  about  co-workers’  wages  can  be 
detrimental for effort provision. In the pay secrecy treatment workers effort levels are 
higher  than  in  the  other  two  treatments  as  with  public  wages  employees  who  are 
underpaid relative to the co-worker exert less effort than employees in the pay secrecy 
treatment.  Interestingly,  this  holds  even  when  co-workers’  wages  are  chosen 
exogenously. Moreover, in the latter case, workers lower their effort provision even if 
they are overpaid relative to the co-workers.
In Abeler et al. (2010) one principal is matched with two agents, who simultaneously 
choose effort in the first stage of a gift-exchange game and principals chooses a wage 
only after having observed the agents effort choices. In one treatment the principal has 
to pay the same wage to both agents while in a second treatment she can set different 
wages for the two agents.  The authors find that in the equal wage treatments  effort 
levels are significantly lower than when agents are paid individually, suggesting that 
agents perceive equal wages for unequal performance as unfair. In the individual wage 
treatment principals seem to anticipate that and pay higher wages to agents who exert 
higher effort.  Moreover, when wages are set equal by the employer, employees who 
initially work hard tend to reduce effort to the level of their low-performing co-workers. 
The opposite occurs when workers are paid individually.  In that case, those workers 
who initially exert low effort align with the high-performers.
Siang,  Requate  and  Waichman  (2010)  also  test  for  horizontal  comparisons  in  a 
bilateral gift-exchange game, under both random and fixed matching, where workers are 
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provided with either quantitative or qualitative information about the average wage in 
the  market.3 Overall,  it  is  found  that  letting  players  receive  any  information  about 
average wages has a decreasing effect on both wage and effort in the random matching 
treatments, and the opposite effect under the fixed matching protocol. 
Framing
The way decision tasks are presented in the laboratory may affect behavior. Charness, 
Frechette and Kagel (2004) investigate whether providing experiment participants with 
a comprehensive payoff table has any effect on gift-exchange. They run a standard gift-
exchange game under two different conditions. In both conditions subjects are given the 
payoff functions and in one treatment subjects are, in addition, given a complete payoff 
table  reporting firms and workers’  payoffs  for  all  combination  of wages and effort. 
Charness, Frechette and Kagel (2004) find that the provision of such table, although 
unnecessary for the subjects to be able to compute payoffs, does have an impact on their 
behavior.  Still  gift-exchange is  observed in both treatments  but  the inclusion of the 
payoff table significantly decreases wages and effort. Further, with the payoff table the 
wage-effort relationship seems to become weaker over time, especially towards the end 
of the experiment suggesting strategic  effort choices.  The authors propose two main 
explanations for the lowered gift-exchange but leave the ultimate reason open. On the 
one hand, working through the table and focusing on it may have led workers somehow 
to regard their effort choices and firms’ wage decisions as not linked to each other. On 
the other hand, the payoff table might have made the distributional consequences more 
salient, as firms’ marginal benefit resulting from an increased effort decreases as wage 
increases, which might induce lower effort.
Stake levels
Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva (2002) study the impact of the interaction between 
competitive  labor  markets  and high stakes  on  fairness  concerns.  They  conduct  two 
treatments  of  the  gift-exchange  market:  a  normal  stake  condition  and  a  high  stake 
condition, where in the latter the stake level was ten times higher than in the normal 
3 More precisely, workers are informed if the employer offers a wage which is 5% larger or smaller than  
the average wage across markets.
22
stake condition, and (Russian) subjects’ earnings amounted on average to up to three 
monthly incomes. 
A  comparison  of  participants’  behavior  in  the  two  treatments  reveals  that  the 
introduction of high stakes does not weaken the wage-effort relationship.  Wages are 
above the competitive level and quite similar across conditions and, hence, not affected 
by stake size. The impact of increased stakes on effort is negligible as well. To rule out 
the  possibility  that  the  reported  results  might  be  due  to  Russian  subjects’  peculiar 
characteristics the authors perform two additional experiments under the normal stake 
condition.  One  compares  Russian  to  Austrian  subjects  and  the  other  explores  how 
Russian subjects behave in a complete contract market. The results confirm that Russian 
subjects behavior is not different  from behavior known in the literature.  Overall  the 
results indicate that market institutions are more important in shaping behavior than 
stake size.
Market size
The issue of how market size might affect behavior in a gift- exchange environment 
is  addressed  in  a  recent  paper  by  Brandts,  Gërxhani,  Schram,  and  Ygosse-Battisti 
(2010). They compare two markets, differing in size. In the small market there are 7 
traders  (5  workers  and  2  firms),  while  the  large  market  has  21  trading  agents  (15 
workers  and  6  firms).  In  each  market,  trades  occur  through  two  different  market 
institutions: double auctions (DA) or bilateral negotiations (BN). The experiment lasts 
30 periods in which during the first ten rounds, subjects trade only through DA. In the 
successive 20 periods, at the beginning of each period, firms choose whether to enter the 
DA or privately negotiate with a worker. The worker, in turn, indicates whether or not 
s/he is willing to enter the BN. After that, the game proceeds with wage offers, first, and 
effort decisions, then. 
The authors  report  that  gift-exchange proved to be robust  to  the  variation  of  the 
number of traders in the market.  In both treatments,  effort  and wages are positively 
correlated  and  wages  and efforts  in  BN are  higher  than  in  DA.  In  both  treatments 
aggregate surplus is considerably higher in periods 11-30 (when DA and BN coexists in 
the markets) than in the first 10 periods (with only DA). Hence, the market institution is 
more important in shaping behavior than the market size.
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Transparency
In many employment relationships the amount of effort exerted by the workers is not 
perfectly observable by the employer, a circumstance that is ignored in standard gift-
exchange  experiments.  The  question  arises,  then,  whether  workers  would  still  be 
reciprocal in a situation where hidden actions are possible and, consequently, whether it 
is still profitable for firms to offer generous wages. 
Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) addresses this issue, by investigating how transparency 
of effort  choices  affects  (the degree of)  gift-exchange.  In their  experiment,  a firm’s 
payoff  is  given  by  the  sum  of  a  worker’s  effort  and  a  random  component.  Two 
treatments are conducted. In the revealed-effort treatment, firms are perfectly informed 
about both components of their payoff, whereas in the hidden-effort treatment, firms 
only observe their payoff without any further detail. Their results show that the positive 
wage-effort relation is present in both treatments, but it is much stronger in the revealed 
effort  treatment.  When trying to discern the reasons behind it,  the authors find that 
actual effort levels are quite similar across treatments, but wages in the hidden effort 
treatment are higher. The hidden effort treatment is also characterized by much more 
heterogeneity  in  agents’  behavior.  It  seems that  some agents  take  advantage  of  the 
principal not being able to observe their effort while others are willing to exert even 
more than the efficient effort level in order to signal their willingness to reciprocate. 
Subject pool
Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002) conducted two experiments with two different U.S. 
subject  pools,  MBAs  and  undergraduate  students  to  explore  the  effect  of  work 
experience.  They also compared their  behavior  to that  of Austrian students in Fehr, 
Gächter, Kirchler, and Weichbold (1998) in order to investigate whether peculiarities of 
U.S. society (namely, a more individualistic approach to work) leads to different results 
in terms of gift-exchange. The implemented gift-exchange labor markets consist of one-
sided  auctions  and  firms  were  either  high  productivity  or  low  productivity.  When 
comparing U.S. students, MBAs and Austrian students the authors find that all three 
subject pools exhibit reciprocal preferences, but that U.S. students are less reciprocal 
than MBAs and Austrian students. Similarly, MBAs’ wage offers of are found to be 
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considerably  higher  than  those  of  U.S.  students.  In  order  to  explore  whether  U.S. 
students  weak  gift-exchange  is  due  to  not  being  familiar  with  gift-exchange  labor 
markets the authors conduct another treatment where firms have to submit also a desired 
effort level. In comparison to the first experiment U.S. students exert more effort, which 
suggest that different work experiences of undergraduates and MBAs may account for 
differences in their effort responses. 
Gift-exchange in field experiments
Some  recent  papers  study  whether  and  provide  evidence  that  social  preferences 
identified in the laboratory map into real work environments.
Gneezy and List (2006) hire people to perform two real-effort tasks, one involving 
work in a library and the other involving door-to-door fund raising. In both cases, the 
participants  know  that  it  is  a  one-time  employment.  Two  treatments  per  task  are 
conducted. In both treatments a fixed wage per hour is promised. In the first one the 
promised wage is paid (noGift) and in the second, after the task has been explained, 
participants are told that they will be actually paid a higher wage (Gift). Consistent with 
the laboratory evidence, in the early hours of the task higher wages are reciprocated by 
higher effort levels, as effort in the Gift treatment is markedly higher than in the noGift 
treatment. This effect, however, vanishes over time. After a few hours, effort levels in 
the two treatments are statistically indistinguishable.
Kube,  Maréchal,  and  Puppe  (2012)  analyze  how  strongly  workers  reciprocate 
monetary and non-monetary gifts with higher productivity in a real effort task. They 
hire  students  to  enter  data.  In  the  benchmark  treatment  all  students  are  paid  an 
announced wage. In the cash treatment participants receive a monetary gift, while in the 
bottle treatment they are given a thermos bottle of equivalent monetary value. They also 
run additional control treatments. In one of them, the bottle’s market price is explicitly 
mentioned, to rule out the possibility that workers might overestimate its market value. 
In the choice treatment, conducted to elicit preferences for receiving cash or the bottle, 
subjects can choose between the bottle and the money. Finally, in the origami treatment, 
run to test whether the time and effort invested in the provision of gifts matter, the firm 
gives the workers money in the form of an origami. 
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The  results  show  that  the  nature  of  gifts  determines  the  strength  of  reciprocal 
behavior.  The  cash  gift  has  only  a  statistically  insignificant  impact  on  workers’ 
productivity,  while  the  bottle  starkly  increases  workers’  performance  and the  effect 
remains  large  throughout  the  experiment.  This  result  is  closely  replicated  in  the 
treatment  where  subjects  are  informed  about  the  price  of  the  bottle.  Further,  when 
workers can choose between gifts, almost all of them opt for the cash gift and workers’ 
output is the same as in the no choice bottle treatment and, thus, higher as in the no 
choice money treatment. This suggests that time and effort the firm spends for a gift 
matter for the workers. Intriguingly, the data show that workers reciprocate a money gift 
of the same value as in the cash treatment but presented in origami form with an output 
level that is 30 percent higher.
In  Kube,  Maréchal,  and  Puppe  (forthcoming)  workers  are  hired  by  a  university 
library to  catalog  books.  In  the baseline treatment,  workers  are  paid the announced 
wage. In two other treatments, workers are informed, right before performing their task, 
that they would be paid either less or more than announced, respectively. They find that, 
while unexpected wage cuts severely and persistently reduce productivity,  analogous 
wage increases do not lead to higher output levels. A control treatment, where workers’ 
performance is incentivized with piece rates, shows that productivity levels are much 
higher than in the baseline, demonstrating that workers in the pay raise treatment would 
actually be able to produce more.
Hennig-Schmidt,  Rockenbach  and  Sadrieh  (2010)  hire  students  for  a  database 
updating. Next to the baseline treatment, where all workers are paid the same wage, the 
authors perform some treatments where workers receive an unexpected pay raise and 
some others where workers are also informed about the wage increase of a peer group.
Data show that neither increases in the own wage nor information on peer wages 
seem to affect workers’ effort, irrespective of whether the peer group’s wage is higher 
or  lower  than  the  own  wage.  Hence,  contrary  to  most  laboratory  and  other  field 
experiments there seem to be no positive wage-effort relation. 
The  authors  complement  the  analysis  with  a  real  effort  lab  experiment,  where 
employees either receive a flat wage or are exposed to an unexpected wage increase 
under two conditions, differing in whether the information about the employer’s surplus 
from work effort is available or not. In the absence of surplus information there seems 
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to be no positive relation between wage and effort. However, when surplus information 
is provided this relation is observed. In fact, the positive wage-effort relation is quite 
steep and a pay raise  is  indeed profitable  for the employers  as the fair  wage-effort 
hypothesis  claims.  This result  suggests that workers’ being aware of the employer’s 
surplus maybe crucial for reciprocal inclinations to come into play.
3. Experimental labor markets in macroeconomics and public finance
Laboratory experiments can be a valuable research tool for investigating aggregate 
economic  phenomena.  In  this  section  we survey some papers  that  try  to  assess  the 
impact of taxation on economic performance, mainly focusing on the relation between 
(labor) taxation and unemployment. In a series of studies, Riedl and Van Winden show 
the  existence  of  a  vicious  circle  in  the  interaction  between  wage  taxes  and 
unemployment and suggest that shifting the tax burden from labor to sales or production 
can alleviate the unemployment-boosting effect.  Blumkin,  Ruffle,  and Ganun (2012) 
test the response of labor supply to various forms of taxation and argue that shifting 
taxation  from  labor  to  consumption  increases  labor  supply,  while  Ortona,  Ottone, 
Ponzano, and Scacciati  (2008) find the same effect on effort provision coming from 
destining taxes to insure subjects against risk and to finance public goods.
Riedl and van Winden (2001) are the first to use laboratory experiments to investigate 
the  nexus  between  labor  taxation  and  unemployment.  In  particular,  they  study  the 
effects of a wage tax system to finance unemployment benefits on the performance of 
an economy, mainly in reaction to tax adjustments to a budget deficit or surplus. The 
economy under consideration consists of two countries, a small “home” country and a 
large “foreign” country, where two inputs, capital K and labor L, and two outputs, X 
and Y, can be traded. In each country, goods X and Y are produced in two separate 
sectors with the help of inputs L and K. These inputs are, respectively, traded on a local 
labor  market  (separate  in  each  country)  and  on  an  international  capital  market. 
Similarly, the market for commodity X is international, while the market for commodity 
Y is  local.  Consumers derive utility  from leisure,  the unsold units  of labor,  and the 
consumption of X and Y. They are endowed with some units of labor and capital, and 
they obtain an unemployment benefit for each unsold unit of their labor endowment. 
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The government finances these benefits with the help of a tax on employed labor paid 
by producers. Two tax regimes are implemented in each country. During the first part of 
the experimental  session,  wage taxes  are  held  constant.  During the  second part,  the 
wage tax rate is adjusted to the previous period’s deficit or surplus in the government 
budget. 
Riedl and van Winden (2001) find that, in the constant tax regime, both countries 
experience a budget deficit in all periods, which does not decrease over time. They also 
show that,  while  unemployment  levels  converge  to  the  equilibrium values,  nominal 
wages are very low in both countries. A thorough analysis of consumers and producers 
behavior shows that the former supply too much labor at  given prices, while the latter 
have  a  tendency  to  employ  too  few  labor  units.  This  supports  the  so-called  risk-
compensated price-mechanism hypothesis, which was first detected in pure commodity 
markets by Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995). Normally, when producers make their 
input  decisions,  the  market  conditions  prevailing  at  the  time  consumers  buy  their 
products are unknown, meaning that they face uncertainty about the revenues they can 
make  by  selling  those  products.  Given  this  price  uncertainty,  risk-averse  producers 
demand less labor than predicted in equilibrium. Producers and consumers combined 
behavior  lead  to  an  upward  trend of  unemployment  rates  and  drive  nominal  wages 
down, which explains the observed budget deficit. In the dynamic tax regime, an initial 
considerable increase in the tax rates is observed as the previous periods’ budget is not 
balanced.  Increased  taxes  help  to  decrease  the  budget  deficit  over  time.  In  comes, 
however, at the cost of strong negative effects on the performance of the economy as a 
whole. In both countries unemployment rates increase and real GDP sharply decreases.
In Riedl and van Winden (2007), the authors use the same setup to compare a closed 
with an international economy. Overall the data  confirm the earlier results. When the 
tax rate is constant, in all economies a budget deficit occurs already in early periods. 
The same excess  supply of  labor  is  observed,  which  is  accompanied  by producers’ 
reluctance to buy inputs and a downward trend of wages. Together this accounts for the 
observed budget deficits. Once the dynamic tax regime is introduced, in all economies 
the  deficit  becomes  smaller  due  to  higher  tax  rates  but  the  unemployment  level 
increases,  an  effect  that  is  due to  the  low employment  of  factors  (because  of  price 
uncertainty) and exacerbated for labor by the wage tax.
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These findings show, once again, that there exists a vicious circle in the interaction 
between wage tax and unemployment, and suggests that shifting taxation from labor to 
consumption  or  sales  might  turn  out  to  be  beneficial  for  both  production  and 
employment  levels.  To  explore  this,  Riedl  and  Van  Winden  (2012)  use  the  same 
economic  environment  and  introduce  a  sales-tax-cum-labor-subsidy  (STLS)  system, 
which is compared to a pure wage tax (WT) system. Two treatments are implemented. 
In  the  baseline  treatment,  in  both  the  home  country  and  the  foreign  country 
unemployment benefits are financed with a wage tax. In the alternative treatment, in the 
home country the WT system is substituted by the STLS system while the WT system 
prevails in the foreign country. Next to shifting the tax from labor to sales, in the STLS 
system producers also receive a subsidy equal to the unemployment benefit for each 
unit of labor they employ. Again, a constant tax regime is followed by a regime where 
the tax rate adjusts to previous periods’ budgets. 
In the constant tax regime, (almost) all quantities and prices, as well as economic 
performance indicators, such as unemployment rate and real GDP, weakly converge to 
the theoretically predicted equilibrium values. In the small country, the unemployment 
rate is initially higher when the STLS-system is effective, but it tends to decrease over 
time, despite high sales taxes. On the contrary, such development is not observed under 
the WT-system. Moreover, the declining unemployment under the STLS-system seems 
to be associated with an increase in the budget surplus of the small country, while wage 
taxes are systematically accompanied by budget deficits. A similar pattern is observed 
for the real GDP. At the end of the constant tax regime, the economies under the WT-
system face budget deficits, while budget surpluses are generated in the small country 
under the STLS-system. As a consequence, the transition to the variable tax regime is 
characterized by an increase in the tax rates in the former case, and by a decrease in the 
latter case. The increasing tax rates in the WT-system lead to increasing unemployment 
and a decrease in real GDP, while at the same time the burden from the budget deficit 
merely weakens. In stark contrast,  in the alternative tax system, the initial decline in 
sales tax rates reduces unemployment and boosts real  GDP. In addition,  the budget 
immediately balances and stabilizes over time. Overall, Riedl and van Winden’s (2012) 
results show that the STLS-system leads to a significantly better economic performance 
compared  to  a  wage  tax  system.  These  differential  results  are  mainly  driven  by 
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producers’ reluctance to incur upfront costs when they are uncertain about output prices. 
Importantly,  producers  seem  to  perceive  uncertainty  differently  under  the  two  tax 
systems because receiving a labor subsidy and paying taxes according to sales revenues 
basically gives producers the opportunity to share their risk with the government.
Blumkin,  Ruffle  and  Ganun  (2012)  experimentally  test  the  equivalence  between 
consumption  and  wage  taxes.  They  implement  two  tax  treatments,  one  with  a 
consumption  tax  and  another  with  an  equivalent  wage  tax,  where  subjects  have  to 
decide how to allocate their time between labor (a real-effort task) and leisure. Subjects 
receive an income according to their performance at the real effort-task, which they are 
then asked to allocate between two consumption goods. They also receive a payment for 
each unit of leisure consumed. The experiment consists of three parts: the first two are 
meant  to  measure  and  control  for  subjects’  productivity  and  pre-tax  labor-leisure 
preferences, respectively. Finally, in the third part either a labor-income tax (IT) or a 
consumption tax (CT), depending on the treatment, is introduced. 
Although theoretically equivalent, worker-consumers may work more and consume 
less leisure in presence of a consumption tax because of money illusion, meaning that 
individuals tend to think in nominal and not in real terms (for empirical evidence on 
money illusion see, e.g,,  Fehr and Tyran 2001). In that case labor-income taxes and 
consumption taxes may be perceived differently when the labor supply decision has to 
be made. The impact of the labor-income tax is evident when subjects are asked to make 
their decision while the effect of the consumption tax is not. In consequence, subjects 
would work more in the CT treatment than in the IT treatment. This is indeed what 
authors find. Specifically, those worker-consumers who reduce their labor supply when 
a tax is introduced, reduce it significantly more when there in IT. In line with Riedl and 
van Winden (2012), this result suggests that shifting taxation from labor to consumption 
might  potentially  lead to  welfare improvements,  with higher  individuals’  utility  and 
unchanged government tax revenues. (A related salience effect of taxation is also found 
for consumer goods by Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009)
Ortona et al. (2008) investigate the relation between labor supply and taxation, but 
assume that tax revenues are used for the production of public goods. More specifically, 
they run a real effort  experiment and compare the labor supply in two states of the 
world. In a so-called state of nature (SN) there is a certain risk to lose part of the earned  
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income and there are no taxes, insurance and public goods, and a welfare state (WS), 
where there is the same risk partially insured, a proportional income tax and a public 
good. Subjects are requested to state both how many tasks they want to perform under 
each contract and their preference for a contract, before they are randomly assigned to 
one of the two contracts and actually carry out the given task. Their main result is that 
subjects  work more under WS than under SN, which suggests that the fact  that the 
returns from taxes are used to protect subjects against risk and provide public goods 
does not reduce, but possibly increases, labor supply.
4. Conclusions
Laboratory experiments have entered labor economics and the generated results have 
significantly increased our knowledge on a variety of aspects. In this paper we have 
surveyed part of this literature and concentrated on two main areas. The first part has 
been devoted to the behavioral consequences of contractual incompleteness in a gift-
exchange  environment  and  in  the  second  part  more  macroeconomics  oriented 
experiments  have  been  presented,  which  mainly  focus  on  the  interaction  between 
taxation and labor market performance. 
Many employment relations are often contractually incomplete in terms of effort that 
workers are required to exert. In such contexts, workers’ reciprocal inclinations play an 
important  role  in  determining the overall  surplus and profit  of the  firm.  Laboratory 
experiments provide abundant evidence that a sizable share of people exhibits fairness 
concerns and shows that reciprocity often can substitute for the absence of a formal 
contract  enforcement  device.  It  is  now  a  well-established  result  that  a  positive 
relationship  between  the  wages  offered  by  firms  and  the  effort  exerted  by  workers 
exists, and that employers are actually willing to offer wages higher than the prevailing 
minimum to  elicit  higher  effort.  The  prevalence  of  reciprocity  in  the  form of  gift-
exchange has been shown in one-shot interactions as well as in repeated interactions.
The importance of gift-exchange in employer-employee relations has several policy 
implications. For instance, it has been shown that gift-exchange wages turn out to be 
downwardly rigid speaking to Bewley’s (1999) book title “why recessions don’t fall 
during recessions.” A consequence is that the introduction of a minimum wage may 
have  unintended  effects  as  it  has  been  shown  that  a  minimum  wage  may  change 
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workers’ reference point of a fair wage and, hence, affect their effort provision. Further, 
the interaction between reciprocal inclinations and various incentive schemes has to be 
carefully taken into account as it does not necessarily hold that explicit incentives will 
have unambiguous positive effects on effort. In fact, explicit incentives may crowd out 
intrinsic motivation as agents may consider a fine or a punishment as a hostile act or 
being monitored as a signal of distrust, which may induce lower effort levels.
The positive relationship between wage and effort has been confirmed under a broad 
range of conditions. Among other, studies have also shown that MBAs are much more 
reciprocal  than  undergraduates.  Nevertheless,  the  generalizability  of  gift-exchange 
results to more complex field environments has sometimes been questioned. Recently, 
scholars have been started to study situations where employers can hire more than one 
worker, focusing in particular on the interplay between reciprocity and wage and effort 
comparisons.  Overall  also  in  these  studies  gift-exchange  is  observed.  However,  the 
strength of it may hinge on details of the environment. For instance, effort comparisons 
seem to have a stronger impact on workers’ effort choices than wage comparisons.
Also only recently field experiments have been used to investigate gift-exchange. The 
empirical results of the few studies are mixed in that some find a positive wage-effort 
relationship while others don’t. In the field, it seems that a wage cut has stronger effects 
than  a  wage  increase  and  non-monetary  gifts  have  a  stronger  effect  than  a  purely 
financial  gift.  An important open question is also the longevity of gift-exchange. As 
field experiments are almost always less controlled than laboratory set-ups it is not clear 
yet what precisely is behind the larger variation in outcomes in field settings. It seems 
clear  that  much  more  research  is  required  to  filter  out  the  institutional  details  that 
enhance or hamper gift-exchange in work relationships.
The  second  part  of  this  survey  has  been  dedicated  to  the  relatively  small  but 
important  set  of  experiments  aimed  at  assessing  the  impact  of  fiscal  policies  on 
economic performance, while taking a close look at the evolution of the labor market. 
There results show the existence of a vicious circle in the interaction between wage 
taxes  and  unemployment  because  increasing  labor  taxes  to  balance  budget  deficits 
strongly  and  negatively  affect  overall  economic  performance.  It  is  suggested  that 
shifting the tax burden from labor to sales or production might alleviate this effect. This 
research  also  explores  conditions  under  which  imposing  a  tax  might  foster  effort 
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provision.  For instance,  it  is  found that  shifting taxation  from labor  to consumption 
increases labor supply. Overall, the number of laboratory experiments explicitly aiming 
at labor market questions traditionally belonging to macroeconomics and public finance 
are still very rare. Interestingly, it is precisely these more traditional areas in economics 
that  lately  have  been  criticized  by  a  skeptical  public  opinion.  More  experimental 
research in the laboratory (as well as the field) investigating such important questions as 
the  perception  of  salience  of  different  forms  of  labor  taxation  and  the  behavioral 
equivalence of theoretically equivalent policy interventions could help could be very 
informative  for  these fields  too.  Moreover,  most  of  the experimental  labor  research 
takes place in a partial equilibrium setting where labor relationships and labor markets 
are assumed to operate on an isolated island. This has been an important and useful 
restriction in order to generate first clean results. Now the evidence and our knowledge 
has accumulated so much that time seems ripe to make the step out of the partial world 
and investigate more general market interactions in labor relations as it already has been 
done in international trade and other interactive markets experiments (Lei and Noussair 
2007, Noussair et al. 1995, 2007).
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